True or false? SELECT: 4 Q: Berkeley and Skinner were monists. A. True B. False ANSWER: A POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Q: Ryle thinks mentalistic terminology (e.g., references to "internal," "subjective" events such as intentions and feelings) is essential for adequate description of human activity. A. True B. False ANSWER: A POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Q: Descartes opposes dualism. A. True B. False ANSWER: B POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Q: The mind-body problem is a consequence of the Cartesian dualist picture of human nature. A. True B. False ANSWER: A POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Q: B. F. Skinner says teleological descriptions and explanations of human behavior are unscientific. A. True B. False ANSWER: A POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Q: Gilbert Ryle was a hard behaviorist. A. True B. False ANSWER: B POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Q: There is no mind-body problem for a metaphysical idealist. A. True B. False ANSWER: A POINTS: 1 TYPE: MC Fill in blanks. SELECT: 4 Q: Trying to pinpoint the physical location of team spirit on the playing field is an example of the sort of error Ryle calls a __________________________. ANSWER: category mistake POINTS: 1 TYPE: FB Q: The ontological view that reality can't be reduced to only one or two kinds is called _____________________________. ANSWER: pluralism POINTS: 1 TYPE: FB Q: The Greek philosopher ____________________________, said reality consisted of substances, and that substances in almost all cases consisted of matter and form. ANSWER: Aristotle POINTS: 1 TYPE: FB Q: The philosopher associated with the "Copernican revolution of philosophy," who said our brains help construct our experience via innate synthetic a priori categories, was _________________________________. ANSWER: Kant POINTS: 1 TYPE: FB Q: _____________________________ is the ontological view that two kinds of reality — physical and non-physical — exist. A. dualism B. substance dualism C. Cartesian dualism ANSWER: A, dualism, B, substance dualism, C, Cartesian dualism POINTS: 1 TYPE: FB Essays SELECT: 2 Q: Explain the difference between hard and soft behaviorism. POINTS: 2 TYPE: ES ANSWER: Hard behaviorism is the view that mental events do not exist. It is a metaphysical view, in that it says mental events are not real.Soft behaviorism is the view that psychology should proceed as though mental events do not exist. Soft behaviorism is not a metaphysical view -- it makes no claim about whether or not mental events exist. Soft behaviorists are persuaded by old-style dualist arguments that mental events are unobservable. If mental events are unobservable, and if science should concern itself only with the observable, then if psychology wants to be a real science, it simply cannot mention the invisible "mental". Q: Why do mental states and processes pose problems for materialism and substance dualism? POINTS: 2 TYPE: ES ANSWER: Mental states pose problems for materialism because if materialism is true, there simply are NO invisible private subjective "mental" events -- and this seems absurd, especially when you're talking about your OWN mental events. For example, it seems self-contradictory to say "I think I have no thoughts."
Mental events also pose problems for substance dualism. Substance dualism gives rise to metaphysical category mistakes. If substance dualism is true, then everything that exists must be either mental (invisible, free, private, etc.) OR physical (visible, determined, public, etc.), and cannot be both. This leads to inevitable mis-categorizations of some events (category mistakes). There are two types of miscategorization.
Q: Explain at least two objections to substance dualism. POINTS: 2 TYPE: ES ANSWER: The following are objections to substance dualism:
- "Mental" events, because they are (by the restricted substance dualist categories) "mental," get classified as invisible and unobservable -- when their normal effects ARE observable (usually). For example, if a substance dualist classifies pain as mental, the substance dualist must say pain CANNOT also have a physical dimension, and therefore pain medications, which act on the physical body, are pointless, so people should deal with pain purely by "mental" means (e.g., the Christian Science view).
- The second kind of miscategorization is that "physical" events, because they are (by the restricted substance dualist categories) "physical," get classified as public and observable -- but some physical events do have invisible and unobservable elements also. For example, a substance dualist who acknowledges pain as a neuronal (physical) event must therefore say (stangely) that pain has no reality as subjective feeling -- like behaviorists who deny the existence of mental events.
(1) Substance dualism makes ordinary mind-body interaction incomprehensible.
(2) If the mental is really free from ordinary physical causal laws, but the physical must adhere to physical laws, then substance dualism depicts humans with free minds imprisoned in totally determined bodies -- i.e., human freedom is meaningless, since it cannot be exercised as long as humans are embodied.
(3) Substance dualism gives rise to metaphysical category mistakes. If substance dualism is true, then everything that exists must be either res cogitans (mental, invisible, free, private, etc.) OR res extensa (physical, visible, determined, public, etc.), and cannot be both. Thus some events are inevitably mis-categorized. There are two types of miscategorization.
Q: Why does Ryle oppose Cartesian dualism (aka substance dualism)? POINTS: 2 TYPE: ES ANSWER: Ryle opposes Cartesian dualism because it fails to explain what it is supposed to explain, and creates more conceptual problems than it solves. Cartesian dualism is supposed to explain the relationship between mental events and bodily events. It "explains" that relation by saying the "mental" and the "physical" are two radically different and incompatible types of being (res cogitans and res extensa respectively). But if they are radically different and incompatible types of being, then it is impossible to imagine how the mental stuff (res cogitans) could ever influence the physical stuff (res extensa), or vice versa. The laws that apply to one kind of being simply do not apply to the other. For example, if substance dualism is correct, there's no way to understand how a blow to the head (a res extensa event) could in any way affect consciousness (res cogitans). But blows to the head sometimes appear to cause unconsciousness (i.e., the physical appears to influence the mental). That simply could not happen in the substance dualist framework.
- "Mental" events, because they are (by the restricted substance dualist categories) "mental," get classified as invisible and unobservable -- when their normal effects ARE observable (usually). For example, if a substance dualist classifies pain as mental, the substance dualist must say pain CANNOT also have a physical dimension, and therefore pain medications, which act on the physical body, are pointless; and people should deal with pain purely by "mental" means (e.g., the Christian Science view).
- The second kind of miscategorization is that "physical" events, because they are (by the restricted substance dualist categories) "physical," get classified as public and observable -- but some physical events do have invisible and unobservable elements also. For example, a substance dualist who acknowledges pain as a neuronal (physical) event must therefore say (stangely) that pain has no reality as subjective feeling -- like behaviorists who deny the existence of mental events.